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ABSTRACT 
There have been research activities in the area of keystroke dynamics biometrics on physical keyboards (desktop 
computers or conventional mobile phones) undertaken in the past three decades. However, in terms of touch 
dynamics biometrics on virtual keyboards (modern touchscreen mobile devices), there has been little published 
work. Particularly, there is a lack of an extensive survey and evaluation of the methodologies adopted in the area. 
Owing to the widespread use of touchscreen mobile devices, it is necessary for us to examine the techniques and 
their effectiveness in the domain of touch dynamics biometrics. The aim of this paper is to provide some insights 
and comparative analysis of the current state-of-the-art in the topic area, including data acquisition protocols, feature 
data representations, decision making techniques, as well as experimental settings and evaluations. With such a 
survey, we can gain a better understanding of the current state-of-the-art, thus identifying challenging issues and 
knowledge gaps for further research. 
Keywords: Biometrics; touch dynamics; authentication; access control; mobile device security; keystroke dynamics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological advancement in computing, communicational devices, as well as network connectivity is shifting 
the usage of conventional desktop computers to mobile devices. It is predicted that there will be a staggering amount 
of over 2 billion smartphone users worldwide by the year 2016 (emarketer, 2014). The increasing reliance on these 
devices inevitably implies the increase in sensitive data stored on this platform. Unfortunately, the portability of 
mobile devices also makes it vulnerable to theft (Raghunathan et al., 2003). Data leakage and misuse of stolen 
device are potentially more damaging than the cost of the device itself (Crawford et al., 2013). 
Knowledge-based authentication methods, such as passwords, PINs or pattern locks (hereafter referred to as 
passcode), are still the primary methods used to authenticate mobile users (Khan et al., 2014). However, these 
methods are vulnerable to a number of security threats or attacks, including brute force attacks (Kim, 2012), 
shoulder surfing (Zakaria et al., 2011), and smudge attacks (Giuffrida et al., 2014). Also, the usage pattern of mobile 
devices is usually in short bursts of intervals (Frank et al., 2013), and this significantly increases the frequency of 
authentication that is required as compared to the case of desktop computers. Higher authentication frequency 
lowers usability (Harbach et al., 2014). To balance the conflict between security and usability, measures such as the 
delayed authentication, e.g. a device is set to have some idle time before reauthentication requests are required, can 
be used (Sen and Muralidharan, 2014). Even so, the issue of how to enhance security, while, at the same time, still 
be able to maintain minimal user intervention or maximum usability remains unsolved. 
An alternative to the passcode approach to authentication is the biometrics authentication. The latter identifies a 
person based on his/her physiological or behavioral characteristics. Physiological biometrics is a relatively stable 
physical feature of a human body, such as fingerprint, facial characteristics, and iris pattern. Behavioral biometrics, 
on the other hand, is traits that are acquired from human behavior or habits like signature, voice, gait and keystroke 
dynamics. Biometrics authentication methods are considered to be more secure than other authentication methods 
(e.g. passcode) because biometrics cannot be lost or stolen (if used securely) and is harder to be forged (Jain et al., 
2008). To ensure that a biometrics authentication method is effective, the method should not only be secure, but also 
usable. (Hanul Sieger et al., 2010) conducted a survey to study how participants ranked the perceived security 
protection and the usability (willingness to use the method) of different types of biometrics authentication methods 
on mobile devices. The survey reported that the iris and voice biometrics authentication methods were ranked the 
highest in terms of the perceived security protection, but the lowest in terms of usability. This shows that a 
biometrics authentication method, regarded as providing a stronger level of security protection, may not be the most 
usable method 
According to the survey results reported by (De Luca et al., 2015), one of the important factors influencing the 
  
participants’ choice as which biometrics authentication method they prefer to use on a mobile device is the usability 
factor. They identified two primary usability issues that put off participants’ adaptation of a biometrics 
authentication method, namely, (i) slow authentication speed and inconvenience and (ii) social awkwardness. For 
the first issue, for example, in the case of face biometrics, participants felt that it was difficult and time consuming to 
align the face correctly in front of the device’s camera. In the case of fingerprint biometrics, the participants felt that 
it was hard to scan a fingerprint properly when the fingers were too oily or dry, or when the device was covered with 
a protective casing. For the second issue (i.e. social awkwardness), for example, participants felt that it was 
awkward to hold a device in front of a face to perform an authentication task in a public area. This is more so the 
case in the context of mobile devices, where the use of these devices in a public area is very common and frequent. 
Touch dynamics is a behavioral biometrics, which captures the way a person touches on a touchscreen device. 
Similar to other biometrics data, touch dynamics biometrics can be used to identify a person/user, and can also be 
used in conjunction with a passcode authentication method to achieve an enhanced level of security in user 
authentication and in the protection of mobile devices. This method can be implemented by employing existing 
sensors embedded in a mobile device, so it is comparatively cheaper than other biometrics authentication method. In 
addition, this method is non-intrusive and can operate in parallel with a person’s normal mobile device usage 
activities (Shen et al., 2016). The existing passcode authentication method has a wide social acceptance, and the 
touch dynamics authentication method is also expected to be widely acceptable by the general public (Campisi et al., 
2009).  
Owing to the potential of touch dynamics biometrics, there have been increasing research efforts in this topic area, 
as shown in Fig. 1. This paper provides a survey of these efforts discussing their major contributions and identifying 
issues for further research. The main contributions of this paper are three-folds. Firstly, it presents a comprehensive 
survey of published works in the topic area of touch dynamics biometrics highlighting their contributions and 
technological advances in the topic area. Secondly, it critically analyzes these related works from a range of 
perspectives, leading to the identification of knowledge gaps and issues for further research. Finally, the references 
cited in this paper provide a useful lead into this topic area. 
 
Fig. 1. The increasing trend of research works on touch dynamics biometrics 
In detail, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of touch dynamics biometrics in 
general. Sections 3-8, respectively, compares the related works in terms of their experimental designs, data 
acquisition methods, feature selection strategies, decision making techniques, fusion approaches, and data adaptation 
approaches. Their performances are discussed in Section 9. The identified knowledge gaps and issues for further 
research are outlined in Section 10. Finally, Section 11 concludes the paper. To the best of our knowledge, there has 
not been a similar paper published in literature at the time of this writing. 
2. TOUCH DYNAMICS BIOMETRICS 
2.1. Overview 
Touch dynamics biometrics refers to the process of measuring and assessing human touch rhythm on touchscreen 
mobile devices (e.g. smartphones and digital tablets). A form of digital signatures is generated upon human 
interactions with these devices. These signatures are believed to be discriminative and unique for each individual, so 
may be used as a personal identifier. 
In the 1860’s, when the telegraph was the main method for long distance communication, operators ‘identified’ 
each other through ways in which they tapped on telegraph keys (Bryan and Harter, 1897). Today, telegraph keys 
have been replaced by computer keyboards, mobile keypads, and virtual keyboards. Computer keyboards have been 
the most common input devices since the late 20th century. It is well-known that human keyboard typing patterns 
are unique so could be used as a personal identifier (Obaidat and Sadoun, 1996).  
One of the earliest research work on keystroke dynamics authentication was conducted by (Gaines et al., 1980). 
They carried out an experiment to try to recognize 6 professional secretaries by analyzing the way they typed three 
passages of texts consisted of 300 to 400 words each. Since then, many related efforts have been made. Crawford, 
Karnan and Teh et al. have, independently, written surveys of the published works on keystroke dynamics 
authentication (Crawford, 2010; Karnan et al., 2011; Teh et al., 2013). However, these early works largely focused 
on keystroke dynamics authentication on computer keyboards. With the rapid development of mobile 
communication technologies, more recently research efforts in this area have been focused on mobile devices with 
physical keypads (Campisi et al., 2009; Clarke and Furnell, 2007; McLoughlin and Naidu, 2009). Most recently, the 
research activities are largely carried out in the context of touchscreen mobile devices. Fig. 2 summarizes the 
timelines of the touch dynamics biometrics research as influenced by technological developments in the sector.  
 
Fig. 2. The evolution of touch dynamics biometrics research 
Touch dynamics biometrics have their unique merits or useful features, while at the same time, they also 
introduce challenging issues. The sections below summarize the merits and the challenging issues. 
2.2. Features  
A touch dynamics authentication system can offer a number of useful features compared to the other types of 
biometrics authentication system. These are: 
Distinctiveness: Touch dynamics patterns are capable of generating multi-dimensional features, such as timing, 
spatial and motion features. These multi-dimensional features can be measured up to a precision level that is 
significantly higher than human perception (Zheng et al., 2014). These unique features are hard to replicate 
consistently, therefore, can be used for authentication. 
Enhanced Security: Despite its weaknesses, passcodes have been the most widely accepted and deployed 
authentication method (Schlöglhofer and Sametinger, 2012). By integrating touch dynamics biometrics into 
passcode authentication method, the overall assurance level can be increased. 
Continuous Monitoring: Touch dynamics biometrics can be used to verify the authenticity of a user beyond the 
initial authentication by constantly monitoring the user touch dynamics patterns. In other words, user 
reauthentication can be performed easily and non-intrusively throughout an active login session. In this way, 
security protection goes beyond initial login without compromising usability. This is one of the most notable 
advantages touch dynamics biometrics have over other physiological biometrics. 
Revocability: In an event when a passcode associated with a touch dynamics template is compromised, a new 
touch dynamics template can easily be generated when a new passcode is created. This is not the case for other 
physiological biometrics. For example, with iris or face biometrics, once they are compromised, there will be no 
replacement, and for fingerprints biometrics, the number of replacements is limited (humans have only 10 fingers to 
use after all).  
Non-dependency: A mobile device usually operates in an on-the-go manner, so the surrounding lighting 
condition and background noise level are, in most cases, constantly changing. In comparison with other biometrics 
features, such as face and voice biometrics, the feature acquisition of touch dynamics biometrics is less sensitive to 
these environmental factors. Therefore, it is more suited to, and can be more easily deployed to a mobile device. 
Transparency: Touch dynamics authentication system requires little or no additional interventions from a mobile 
device user. This is because the acquiring and processing of touch dynamics patterns can be carried out in the 
background while the user is using the device. Users may not be aware that their touch dynamics patterns are being 
captured, the captured data are being used for authentication, and the authentication is carried out periodically or 
they are protected by an extra layer of authentication. This is in a stark contrast to other biometrics authentication 
systems that usually require explicit alignment of a biometrics feature to a specific sensor. For example, in the case 
  
of iris authentication, a user is required to look straight into a camera to take an iris image, and in the case of 
fingerprint authentication, a user needs to put one of his/her fingers on the fingerprint sensor. 
Familiarity: The touch dynamics data used for authentication is acquired during mobile users’ routine input 
activities. This is a process which mobile users are already familiar with, so the data acquisition operation tends to 
have a gentler learning curve with a higher usability level than other biometrics data acquisition cases.  
Cost Effectiveness:  In contrast to other physiological biometrics authentication methods such as iris and 
fingerprint biometrics that typically require the use of specialized hardware, touch dynamics authentication system 
only uses built-in mobile sensors. This can reduce device costs and it is ideal for large-scale deployments. 
2.3. Challenging Issues 
The design of a touch dynamics authentication system imposes a number of challenging issues: 
Minimizing Computation and Communication Costs: Computational capabilities of mobile devices are 
typically lower than desktop computers. This means that certain criteria such as algorithm complexity, 
communication cost, and authentication delay are important and should be considered in the design of touch 
dynamics authentication solutions. In other words, algorithm and communication costs introduced as the result of 
deploying this authentication means should be minimal.  
Minimizing Energy Consumption: Mobile devices, unlike desktop computers, are operated by batteries. The 
less the energy an application consumes, the longer the device can operate. Though communication is the major 
consumer of the battery power of a mobile device (Perrucci et al., 2009), the number and usage frequencies of 
various sensors embedded in a mobile device, which are used to extract touch dynamics data, also have a direct 
impact on the mobile device battery consumption. Various measures, such as reducing the sampling rate (Niu and 
Chen, 2012) or performing complex computation only when a device is being recharged (Crawford et al., 2013), 
have been proposed to reduce power consumption of a mobile device. 
Maximizing Accuracy: The accuracy performance of touch dynamics authentication system is relatively low in 
comparison to other physiological biometrics authentication system (e.g. fingerprint and iris). This is because touch 
dynamics biometrics features (or feature data) acquired at different occasions are likely to exhibit a certain degree of 
variations due to external factors such as fatigue, mood, or distraction. Therefore, consideration should be given as 
how to increase the accuracy performance of a touch dynamics authentication system in the design of the method. 
Adaptation Capability: Human behavioral characteristics typically change over time, and they usually change 
more frequently than physiological characteristics. A user’s touch dynamics patterns can gradually change as the 
user gets more familiar with the passcode, input method, device, and other external factors. A touch dynamics 
authentication system should be capable of adapting itself to any changes in a user’s touch dynamics pattern. 
2.4. Operational Process 
A typical touch dynamics authentication system is illustrated in Fig. 3. From the figure, we can see that the 
operation of this system can largely be captured in three major phases: (i) User Enrolment, where touch dynamics 
data (or samples) are acquired, processed, and stored as a reference template, (ii) User Authentication, where a touch 
dynamics test sample is compared against the stored reference template(s) to determine the similarity or 
dissimilarity, and (iii) Data Retraining, where reference template is updated to reflect any changes in the latest touch 
dynamics data. The three operational phases are accomplished by a number of functional blocks (i.e. architectural 
components), each of which performs a well-defined function, and these components and their respective functions 
are described below. 
 Fig. 3. A touch dynamics authentication framework 
Data Acquisition: Data acquisition is an operation by which raw touch dynamics data are acquired. This is 
usually carried out as the first step and during the setup stage of a touch dynamics authentication system. The 
acquired raw data are usually a set of repeated (multiple) input samples acquired over a specified period of time. 
Devices commonly used for data acquisition are commercial off-the-shelf smartphones (Buschek et al., 2015; 
Trojahn et al., 2013; Zheng et al., 2014) or, in some cases, digital tablets (Saravanan et al., 2014). 
Data Preprocessing: Data preprocessing is carried out to remove outliers in the raw data, improving data quality 
and accuracy performance. Techniques used in this operation include outlier detection and removal (Zheng et al., 
2014). A dimension reduction technique may also be used to ensure that raw data remain small yet representable, for 
the sake of computational efficiency on resource limited mobile devices (de Mendizabal-Vazquez et al., 2014). 
Feature Extraction: Feature extraction is a mandatory operation that is carried out in both user enrollment and 
authentication phases. The main task of this operation is to identify and extract distinctive features common to a user 
from the acquired raw data. These features will be later used for template generation. Possible features extracted 
from human touch dynamics data can be categorized into three broad categories, namely timing, spatial and motion 
features (further discussions in Section 5).  
Template Generation: Template generation is an operation carried out to transform the extracted feature into a 
compact form that uniquely represents the user’s touch dynamics characteristic. Normally, several different types of 
features are concatenated into a sequence of n-dimensional feature vectors, where n is the number of feature 
elements (Cai et al., 2013; Serwadda et al., 2013). These unique reference templates are then stored for user 
authentication or data retraining purpose.  
Data Classification: Data classification is the major operation for most biometrics authentication methods, where 
feature data are categorized and compared against reference templates. The outcome of this phase is normally 
associated with a matching score used for decision making. Data classification is usually carried out using machine 
learning techniques (also referred to as data classification algorithms or classifiers), and a number of machine 
learning techniques have been used for this purpose in literature of touch dynamics biometrics (further discussions 
in Section 6). 
Decision Making: Decision making is an operation carried out to determine if the touch dynamics data submitted 
by a user is indeed originated from the target user. This decision is made by comparing the similarity or dissimilarity 
score generated from a machine learning technique against a predefined threshold (Bo et al., 2014; Kolly et al., 
2012). Before the final decision is made, a fusion approach may be applied to combine either the information from 
multiple features (Buschek et al., 2015; Jeanjaitrong and Bhattarakosol, 2013) or to combine the matching scores 
from different machine learning techniques (Samura et al., 2014), to increase accuracy performance. 
Data Adaptation: Data adaptation is an operation carried out to retrain or update the reference template with the 
latest touch dynamics patterns from a user. This operation is required because a user’s touch dynamics patterns may 
gradually change over time, causing the initially enrolled reference template to deviates from the most recent touch 
dynamics patterns from the same user. By adding an adaption component that performs the data adaptation operation 
after each successful authentication, these gradual changes can be captured and taken into account (Crawford et al., 
2013). 
 
  
2.5. Evaluation Criteria 
A touch dynamics authentication system can be deployed in one of the two modes, a verification (or 
authentication) mode and an identification (or recognition) mode. These modes serve different purposes and usage 
scenarios. The verification mode is used to verify a claimed identity. It is used to answer the question “is this person 
whom he/she claims to be”. The authentication of a mobile user or a mobile device fits into this mode. The 
identification mode, on the other hand, is used to classify and identify some unknown identity. It is used to answer 
questions such as “who is this person” or “is this person in the database”. This mode is typically used for forensic 
investigations or intrusion detections. As shown in Fig. 4, the fundamental difference between the two modes is that, 
in the verification mode, the checking between the touch dynamics data submitted by a user and the reference 
template is 1-to-1, whereas, in the identification mode, this checking is 1-to-many. According to our literature 
survey, the number of papers published on the study of the verification mode (74%) is much higher than the 
identification mode (26%). 
 
Fig. 4. The deployment modes of a touch dynamics authentication system 
The focus of this paper is on authentication using touch dynamic biometrics, so hereafter our analysis is on the 
verification mode. To assess the suitability of a biometrics authentication method to real-world applications, three 
major criteria should be used to evaluate the system. These are verification accuracy, system efficiency, and system 
usability. 
Verification Accuracy: The metrics that are commonly used to evaluate the verification accuracy of a biometrics 
authentication method are the False Rejection Rate (FRR), False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and Equal Error Rate 
(EER). The relationship among these metrics is shown in Fig. 5 and their definitions are given below.  
 
Fig. 5. The relationship between the FRR, FAR, and EER 
False Rejection Rate (FRR): This is the percentage ratio of the number of legitimate users who are falsely rejected 
against the total number of legitimate user trials. A lower FRR value indicates fewer legitimate users being falsely 
rejected. It also means that the system usability level is higher. FRR is also referred to as a false alarm rate, false 
negative rate, false non-match rate, or Type II error.  
False Acceptance Rate (FAR): This is the percentage ratio of the number of illegitimate users who are falsely 
accepted against the total number of illegitimate user trials. Again, a lower FAR value indicates fewer illegitimate 
users being falsely accepted, and this also indicates that the system has a higher security level. FAR is also referred 
to as miss alarm rate, false positive rate, false match rate, or Type I error. 
Equal Error Rate (EER): EER is a single-number performance metric, which is commonly used to measure and 
compare the overall accuracy level of different biometrics authentication method. It is sometimes also referred to as 
Crossover Error Rate (CER). EER can be obtained by finding the interception point of two graphs, one for FRR and 
the other for FAR. Typically, the lower the FRR and the FAR values, the lower the EER value, which in turn 
indicates a better accuracy performance of a biometrics authentication method. However, FRR and FAR are 
negatively correlated, so it is not possible to lower both FRR and FAR values at the same time. Therefore, in real-
life applications, FRR and FAR are usually adjusted and determined based on the security and usability 
requirements of the applications. In some literature, the term ‘accuracy’, rather than EER, is used as an accuracy 
performance metric. It is worth noting that ‘accuracy’ and EER are actually the same; ‘accuracy’ is defined as the 
inverse of EER. In other words, a higher ‘accuracy’ value indicates a better accuracy performance of a biometrics 
authentication method.  
The accuracy performance can also be graphically visualized by using the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve as shown in Fig. 6. This graph is obtained by plotting Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR) against FAR at 
different matching threshold values. GAR is the percentage ratio between the correctly accepted legitimate users 
against the total number of legitimate user trials. It is also referred to as the inverse of FRR (100-FRR), true positive 
rate, or true match rate. A larger area under the curve (nearer the curve towards the top left corner of the graph) 
indicates a better performance. 
 
Fig. 6. The ROC curves of three performance scenarios 
System Efficiency: The system efficiency refers to the computational cost or the authentication delays imposed 
by a biometrics authentication method. Satisfying this criterion is particularly important for computational resource-
limited mobile devices. A complex authentication method may impose a higher level of computational overhead, 
increasing authentication delays and reducing system usability. Therefore, it is important to design authentication 
methods that introduce as low computational overhead as possible. 
System Usability: The system usability (or user acceptance) of an authentication system is also an important 
factor to the successful deployment of a new authentication method. Users will eventually abandon or reluctant to 
use any system that is tedious or slow to use, even if it can offer a higher level of security protection. Therefore, an 
authentication system should offer a good level of system usability and this can be achieved by (i) reducing the 
workload imposed on a user as much as possible, (ii) requiring users’ intervention as less as possible, and (iii) 
making authentication delays as short as possible.  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.1. Working Mode 
The verification mode may operate in either a static or a dynamic manner. The static and dynamic working modes 
are complementary to each other, i.e. they may be deployed independently, or alongside with each other to enhance 
the security protection level afforded to the deployed mobile device. In the following, we discuss the two working 
modes. Hereafter, we use the term, Verification-in-Static-Mode (ViSM), to refer to the verification mode being used 
in the static working mode and, Verification-in-Dynamic-Mode (ViDM), to refer to the verification mode being used 
in the dynamic working mode. 
Verification-in-Static-Mode (ViSM): One application scenario of the ViSM is static authentication, which is 
also known as one-off authentication. In static authentication, a user attempts to authentication him/herself to a 
system at the beginning of a log-in session or at some predefined intervals during a session. For example, a touch 
dynamics authentication method may be integrated with an existing passcode authentication method, forming a so-
called two-factor authentication system, in which the passcode authentication method serves as the first factor and 
the touch dynamics authentication method serves as an additional, i.e. the second, authentication factor. This two-
factor authentication system provides a stronger level of protection than any of the two authentication methods when 
  
they are used alone. In addition, the use of the second authentication factor can also prevent passcode sharing.  
Verification-in-Dynamic-Mode (ViDM): An example application scenario of the ViDM is dynamic 
authentication, also known as continuous authentication. A dynamic authentication method performs authentication 
checks on a user in an application or communication session (i.e. after the initial authentication is performed). The 
dynamics feature may be reflected by the use of information that is generated in real-time during the session to 
authenticate the user and/or by the use of multiple instances of authentication in the session, but the interval between 
the multiple authentication instances are not predefined, e.g. they may be determined by the occurrence of some 
touch events. A touch dynamics authentication system is particularly suited to this mode, as touch dynamics data can 
be acquired transparently over a period of time to revalidate the user’s identity without user’s intervention, and this 
may be done at any point during the session. Continuous authentication can reduce security risks in a number of 
ways such as unauthorized device sharing, device lost/theft, session hijacking, etc. Of course, as in the case of any 
biometrics authentication method, it is important to achieve a low FRR value to make the system more usable, as, 
otherwise, a legitimate user may be locked out of the service in the middle of a session. According to our literature 
survey, more papers have been published for static authentication (77%) than dynamic authentication (23%). 
3.2. Acquisition Devices 
The device selection for data acquisition is also an important factor. Different devices may be equipped with 
different sensors that may have the ability to acquire different types of features. For example, a conventional mobile 
device with a physical keypad is only able to acquire timing feature. In contrast, a recently manufactured 
touchscreen mobile device is more likely to have multiple more powerful built-in sensors that can acquire more 
features (such as pressure, movement, and orientation). As the focus of this paper is on touch dynamics 
authentication, hereafter, we shall only scope our discussions on mobile devices with touchscreens. For existing 
works on keystroke dynamics on mobile devices with physical keypads, readers are referred to review articles such 
as (Crawford, 2010; Teh et al., 2013).  
The majority of the research works carried out in the domain of touch dynamics uses smartphones as their data 
acquisition devices. The only two exceptions are the work reported in (Antal and Szabó, 2014; Bond and E.A., 2015; 
Saravanan et al., 2014), and in these cases, digital tablets were used. This is largely due to the fact that a larger 
population of mobile device users actually use smartphones rather than digital tablets (Taylor, 2015). Researchers 
have been using more recent and more powerful mobile devices to carry out their research works. Modern devices 
usually come with higher precision and resolution sensors that are able to capture higher quality features. Modern 
devices also have greater computational capabilities and resources, which can better support the use of more 
complex algorithms and more able sensors. Another device selection criterion is the intended development platform 
associated with a mobile operating system and this issue is discussed in the next section.  
3.3. Development Platform 
To acquire touch dynamics data, we need to use some toolkit, and, for the development of the toolkit, we need to 
choose a development platform. Based on our literature study, Android is the most popular development platform 
for touch dynamics data acquisition, which is followed by iOS and then by Windows. When selecting a development 
platform, these four factors should be considered, i.e. its customizability, flexibility, cost and market shares.  
Customizability: To acquire touch dynamics data, the ability to log various touchscreen input events is essential. 
However, the native input methods (such as a virtual keyboard or a virtual numeric keypad) used by a mobile 
operating system do not provide any function calls to acquire these data. This is typically part of the security 
measure used to protect against the easy implementation of spyware or touch-logger applications (Kambourakis et 
al., 2014). Therefore, to acquire touch dynamics data, we have to create our own custom input methods with the 
necessary functionalities. Unlike its competitors (iOS and Windows), Android has made this easier by providing 
open source library functions, which allows developers to modify the application framework  (Meng et al., 2013), 
giving them greater flexibility in their application design and customization. 
Flexibility: Flexibility, in terms of cross-platform development, sideloading, and file system visibility are among 
the criteria that contribute to the popularity of a chosen mobile development platform. Android supports cross-
platform development, and this means that developers have the flexibility to develop mobile applications using any 
operating systems and to make use of existing resources in their developments. Also, both Android and Windows 
allow sideloading, which means that an application can be directly installed on a mobile device without first 
publishing it to the mobile application store. Application publishing involves rigid procedures and could be time-
consuming. Therefore, sideloading can reduce the time and effort on application testing and developments. 
Furthermore, direct file explorers have been provided by both Android and Windows providers. This means that 
data and system files can be accessed directly without additional configurations or installations of any third party 
applications. This provides a convenient way for researchers to transfer acquired data files between different devices 
for further analysis. 
Cost: The cost required for acquiring a development tool and device should also be taken into account when 
making the selection. The official integrated development environments (IDEs) required for application 
developments for Android and Windows devices are Android Studio and Visual Studio Express, respectively. They 
are both available for download free of charge. Xcode IDE (iOS devices), on the other hand, is only available once 
an annual subscription fee for application publishing has been paid for, and the cost of the fee is shown in Table I. In 
addition, Android has been used by a wide range of mobile devices. Among the largest manufacturers of Android-
powered mobile devices are Samsung, HTC, and LG. This wider range of devices can provide us with a cheaper 
option to conduct our experiments.  
Table I. The different mobile development platforms 
 Android iOS Windows 
Development Tool Free 
$99/year 
Free 
Publishing Fee $25 one-off $19/year 
Sideloading Yes No Yes 
Programming Language Java Swift C# or VB 
Open Source Yes No No 
Cross Platform Development Yes No No 
File System Visibility Yes No Yes 
Market Share High High Low 
Market Share: Selecting a mobile platform with a larger market share (used by more people) allows a greater 
accessibility to users. To date, Android mobile devices have the strongest end-user demand worldwide, followed by 
iOS and Windows (IDC, 2015). The similar trend is reflected in the selection of prototype development platforms by 
researchers, as shown in Fig. 7 (N/A indicates unspecified). 
 
Fig. 7. The distribution of underlying research development platforms 
3.4. Degree of Control 
The degree of control refers to restrictions or constraints imposed when carrying out an experiment. It covers 
three different aspects, namely, (i) acquisition device selection, (ii) experimental setting control, and (iii) input string 
selection. Generally, the number of experiments that imposes restrictions outnumbers those that do not, and this is 
the case for all three aspects, as shown in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8. The numbers of publications on reporting the degree of control of different aspects imposed in experiments  
  
Acquisition Device Selection: The devices used in experiments can be selected with one of the two approaches. 
One is to use a predetermined device and the other is to use a subject (hereafter refers to a mobile device user 
recruited for an experiment) specific device. Based on our literature survey, a majority of the experiments published 
in literature (94%), with an exception of the work reported in (Alotaibi et al., 2014; Johansen, 2012; Samura et al., 
2014), were undertaken by using the first approach. The primary reason for using a predetermined device is to 
prevent any inconsistencies in the features acquired. For example, the availability of hardware sensors (Alotaibi et 
al., 2014) and the variations in sensor resolution or sensitivity (Seo et al., 2012) between different devices may cause 
inconsistencies in the data acquired. Additionally, as subjects are usually more familiar with their own devices, 
allowing subjects to use their own devices to acquire data may introduce bias in their experimental results. This can 
be avoided by requiring subjects to use a predetermined device for the entire data acquisition operation (Serwadda et 
al., 2013).  
In contrast, some experiments reported in literature were carried out without any restrictions on the types of 
device that should be used, so subjects can use their own devices to acquire data. In this way, more subjects from 
different population groups may be attracted to take part in the experiments. For example, (Johansen, 2012) allowed 
subjects to conduct data acquisition using their own mobile devices via a mobile app, so subjects do not need to 
make physical presence or be supervised throughout the entire data acquisition operation. In other words, as this 
approach removes physical and geographical barriers in conducting experiments, the data acquisition can be 
conducted on a larger scale and can reach to a wider audience. It has also been argued by (Samura et al., 2014) that 
by using a device which the subjects are accustomed to, the experimental results obtained may better reflect their 
actual usage behavior. This is in line with our observation that experiments that did not impose any restrictions on 
the input devices were also operated under uncontrolled environment so that a subject’s touch dynamics can be 
acquired in a natural condition (further discussions in the following section). 
Experimental Setting Control: The experimental setting control refers to the degree of restrictions that are 
imposed on an experiment during a data acquisition operation. Data acquisition may be conducted under two 
settings, (i) supervision with a stringent protocol or (ii) unmonitored without any restrictions. The papers by 
(Alotaibi et al., 2014; Johansen, 2012; Kolly et al., 2012; Samura et al., 2014) reported experiments that were carried 
out without any specific restrictions. A majority of experiments (89%) reported in literature were actually carried out 
under supervised and controlled environments. The primary reason to control an experiment is to reduce the level of 
variations in touch dynamics patterns which may be caused by external factors such as distractions, cognitive load, 
and sickness, etc. Controlling an experiment with a stringent protocol can prevent these external factors from 
inflicting noise (Trojahn et al., 2013), allowing primary experimental variables (i.e. the discriminative capabilities of 
features or the accuracy performance of classifiers) be evaluated more accurately (Cai et al., 2013). Also, the 
unmonitored and uncontrolled experimental setting may risk the data acquired being distorted or tampered with, 
resulting in the reduction of data quality. 
There are also views that touch dynamics data should be acquired in a natural manner without imposing any 
restrictions, or in an environment that can resemble a real-life touchscreen device usage scenario (Alotaibi et al., 
2014). The reason given by the authors was that a subject’s interactivity with his/her device may differ in different 
circumstances, e.g. when performing a task at hand or doing a job in a controlled environment. The authors in 
(Rybnicek et al., 2014) suggested that experimental results obtained under a controlled environment are over 
optimistic compared to those acquired in uncontrolled environments. 
Input String Selection: How to select the input strings or which input strings should be used during experiments 
is another factor one should consider when carrying out touch dynamics related experiments. In the majority of the 
experiments reported in literature (72%), the subjects were asked to provide a predefined set of input strings during a 
data acquisition operation. In other words, the input strings used in these experiments are identical across all the 
subjects. This means that the samples acquired from different subjects in the same dataset can be reused for 
evaluation purposes (not just for template generation), and as a result, a larger number of test samples can be 
acquired without acquiring them separately. However, in certain situations, this approach may not be practical. For 
example, the data acquisition experiments conducted by (Draffin et al., 2014; Y. Meng et al., 2014; Meng et al., 
2013) were aimed at acquiring all the touch dynamics data over an entire interaction session with a device. Due to 
the nature and objective of these experiments, predetermining a set of input strings would not be practical. 
 
 
 
4. DATA ACQUISITION 
4.1. Subject Size 
The subject size used in an experiment is known to have an impact on the obtained results of the experiment 
(Maxion and Killourhy, 2010; Xu et al., 2014). The larger the subject size used in an experiment, the better the 
experimental results can signify the scalability of a study (Bartlow and Cukic, 2006) and reflect the true accuracy 
performance of a biometrics authentication method when deployed in real-world (Jagadeesan and Hsiao, 2009).  
Most experiments recruited less than 50 subjects (Buschek et al., 2015; Kambourakis et al., 2014; Y. Meng et al., 
2014), with some less than 5 subjects (Nixon et al., 2014; Rao et al., 2014). We were only able to find three 
experiments, (Gascon et al., 2014; Serwadda et al., 2013; Trojahn et al., 2013), which used a large number of 
subjects (315, 190 and 152 subjects, respectively). The subject sizes used in the experiments published in literature 
are summarized in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 9. The numbers of publications on reporting different subject sizes  
In most of the experiments (94%), subjects were recruited on a voluntary basis, i.e. without receiving any 
monetary benefits. Only in a few experiments, subjects were awarded cash cards (Buschek et al., 2015; Xu et al., 
2014) or some form of prizes (Johansen, 2012). The awards or prizes were used to motivate the subjects to take part 
in the experiments, increasing the participation rates. A data acquisition operation could be a resource-intensive 
process that requires some dedication and efforts from the subjects. To increase the participation rate or the number 
of subjects taking part in an experiment, (Kolly et al., 2012) suggested that the data acquisition tools can be 
distributed via a mobile application store. This may be a possible way of recruiting a larger number of subjects, but, 
by doing so, control over the data acquisition operation will certainly become limited and the risk of data being 
tampered with or manipulated becomes higher. 
4.2. Subject Demography 
Subjects can be selected based on three variables, namely, by their age, affiliation, and profession. These three 
variables jointly correlate with a subject’s device usage frequencies and familiarity. Therefore, if subjects are not 
selected properly, there may be unintentional biases in the experimental results. 
In the published experiments, subjects were often selected from a specific group of population, e.g. from people 
(i) with a narrow age distribution (i.e. 19-26) (Antal and Szabó, 2014; Buschek et al., 2015; Kambourakis et al., 
2014), (ii) within the same organization (i.e. within a research institute) (Alotaibi et al., 2014; Giuffrida et al., 2014; 
Samura et al., 2014), or (iii) with a specific profession (i.e. students) (Draffin et al., 2014; Y. Meng et al., 2014; 
Meng et al., 2013). This is because a certain group of population is more readily available and is cheaper for 
researchers who often have limited resources to conduct their experiments. However, it may be argued that the data 
acquired from a special group of population may not realistically represent the wider community. 
(Coakley et al., 2015; El-Abed et al., 2014; Kolly et al., 2012) are among the few pieces of work we were able to 
find in literature, which recruited subjects from a population with wide demography, e.g. people from dissimilar age 
groups and/or with different professions. Their goal is to diversify the dataset’s subject demography so that the 
obtained results of the experiments can better resemble real-world scenarios.  
4.3. Input String Type 
The input string type is an important experimental variable in touch dynamics biometrics research, as the feature 
used for touch dynamics biometrics is originated from a subject’s input string. Generally, subjects are required to 
provide character-based (i.e. alphabetic, special character, or alphanumeric input), digit-based (i.e. only numerical 
input), and or other non-specific touch events. The majority of touch dynamics experiments published required a 
subject to either provide a character-based or a digit-based input as shown in Fig. 10.  
  
 
Fig. 10. The distribution of input string types used in touch dynamics experiments 
A character-based input string can be further categorized into short and long character strings. A short input string 
is usually consisted of a username or a password (Huang et al., 2012; Mahnoush Babaeizadeh et al., 2014), a random 
character combination (Antal and Szabó, 2014; Rao et al., 2014), or a set of dictionary words (Buschek et al., 2015; 
Giuffrida et al., 2014). A long input string is usually a segment of texts (Gascon et al., 2014) or several paragraphs 
of texts (Feng et al., 2013; Samura et al., 2014). Likewise, a digit-based input string can also be classified into short 
and long digit strings. A short digit string is typically 4 to 6 digits long. It usually resembles a mobile device 
unlocking code (Zheng et al., 2014) or an ATM PIN number (Sen and Muralidharan, 2014). The length of a long 
digit string, on the other hand, usually exceeds 10 digits, similar to, e.g., a social security number (Johansen, 2012) 
or a phone number (Jain et al., 2014). Other non-specific input types include a random acquisition of some 
continuous touch events (Draffin et al., 2014; Y. Meng et al., 2014), a random multi-touch gesture input (Sae-Bae et 
al., 2012), or touch input interactions with a common user interface element (e.g. buttons, checkboxes and sliders) 
(Kolly et al., 2012; Saravanan et al., 2014), made over a period of time. As most of the published touch dynamics 
experiments focused on the character-based or digit-based input, hereafter we shall focus our discussions on these 
two input types.  
4.4. Input Sample Size 
The input sample size of a dataset is known to have an impact on the accuracy, robustness and conclusiveness of 
the outcome of an experiment (Sen and Muralidharan, 2014; Wolff, 2013). The larger the number of samples we 
use, the better the representation of a subject’s touch dynamics behavior, and, as a result, the higher the accuracy 
performance we could achieve (Tasia et al., 2014). 
There are two ways of acquiring multiple samples in one data acquisition session (i) acquiring a fixed input string 
repeatedly (for character-based or digit-based input), or (ii) continuously acquire touch events over a fixed period of 
time (for non-specific input). According to the literature, the benchmark number of samples per session per subject 
is between 10 to 20 repetitions for the fixed input type (Buschek et al., 2015; Kambourakis et al., 2014; Sen and 
Muralidharan, 2014; Trojahn et al., 2013) and 5 to 10 minutes for non-specific input type (Meng et al., 2013; Xu et 
al., 2014). 
Requesting a large number of samples from a subject in one data acquisition session is impractical. This is 
because subjects may not be available for a long stretch of time, or may feel uncomfortable with a lengthy 
acquisition session (Tasia et al., 2014). Therefore, selecting an optimal number of samples per data acquisition 
session is important. Alternatively, instead of acquiring a large number of samples in one lengthy acquisition 
session, we can carry out the data acquisition operation in multiple shorter sessions spread over a period of time. 
This approach can reduce the level of discomfort imposed on a subject and also better capture any intra-session 
variations (further discussions in the next section). 
4.5. Acquisition Session and Interval 
As mentioned above, a data acquisition operation for each subject can be carried out and completed either within 
a single session or spread over several sessions separated by a predefined time interval. In the majority of the 
reported experiments (64%), data from each subject were acquired within a single session.  
Though the above approach is relatively cheaper, it is not always practical to request a large number of samples 
from each subject in a single session. More importantly, touch dynamics biometrics, like other behavioral biometrics 
(i.e. voice, gait and signature), is not stable over time (Xu et al., 2014). This implies that there may be intra-session 
variations between different input samples in a session, even if the input samples are provided by the same subject. 
If samples are acquired in a single session, the intra-session variations may not be captured. This is evident in the 
experimental work reported by (Buschek et al., 2015), where the accuracy performance evaluated using data 
acquired in a single session is two times better than those obtained in different sessions. This means that 
experimental evaluation using data acquired in single sessions may be over-optimistic, and may not reflect the true 
accuracy of a biometrics authentication method when deployed in real-world. 
Ideally, a data acquisition operation should be divided into multiple sessions separated by some intervals. In this 
way, intra-session variations can better be captured. This approach has been adopted in several experiments reported 
in literature, and, in these experiments, the selected intervals separating different data acquisition sessions vary from 
minutes (Johansen, 2012), days (El-Abed et al., 2014; Serwadda et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2014) to weeks (Buschek et 
al., 2015; Tasia et al., 2014). It is worth noting that careful considerations should be given when determining the 
number of samples and the lengths of intervals separating different sessions. This is because these two factors may 
influence the subject participation rate of an experiment. For example, a data acquisition operation that spans across 
a longer period of time is more likely to receive a lower subject participation rate (due to subjects’ availabilities) or 
may result in a higher subject dropout rate (due to a greater commitment required of the subjects) (De Luca et al., 
2012). Therefore, there is a balance between better capturing subjects’ natural touch dynamics patterns variation, 
and preserving the subject participation rate and commitment to the data acquisition operation. 
4.6. Legitimate and Illegitimate Subject Samples 
The degree of accuracy of a touch dynamics authentication system is measured by using the FAR and the FRR 
values (discussed in Section 2.5). To compute these values, two categories of samples are required, namely, 
legitimate and illegitimate samples. Acquiring the legitimate samples is a straightforward process that has been 
described above. However, for acquiring the illegitimate samples from a subject, there are three approaches: (i) 
partitioning the subject’s samples into two subsets, one used as the legitimate samples, and the other used for the 
illegitimate samples, (ii) acquiring additional samples from a subset of the subjects involved in a dataset, and use 
these additional samples as the illegitimate samples, or (iii) recruiting additional subjects to provide the illegitimate 
samples. 
Based on our literature research, the first approach is most frequently adopted (85%). For example, in these 
experiments (Giuffrida et al., 2014; Y. Meng et al., 2014; Trojahn et al., 2013; Wolff, 2013), 𝑡 out of 𝑖 samples 
acquired were used as the illegitimate samples, with the rest, (𝑡 − 𝑖) samples, used as the legitimate ones. The subset 
of illegitimate samples can be selected in a randomized (Trojahn et al., 2013; Wolff, 2013) or a predefined order 
(Giuffrida et al., 2014; Y. Meng et al., 2014). With this approach, an equal number of the legitimate and the 
illegitimate samples can be obtained with minimal or no additional resources. However, this approach has a 
limitation when the input string is not the same across all subjects, as it is not possible to compare the touch 
dynamics patterns of two input strings when they are different. 
The experiments that do not use the same input string across all the subjects can use the second approach to 
obtaining the illegitimate samples. For example, (Tasia et al., 2014) recruited 100 subjects to provide the legitimate 
samples. Then, 10 subjects were randomly selected from the 100 subjects and were given the PINs of all the other 
subjects. Each of these 10 subjects was given the additional task of providing 5 impersonated samples of each of the 
other 99 subjects. With this approach, the 10 selected subjects need to devote more time and effort to the 
experiment, and this may discourage voluntary participations. For this reason, the number of the illegitimate samples 
acquired is usually smaller than that acquired using the first approach (by partitioning the already acquired 
legitimate samples). 
The third approach is to recruit a separate pool of subjects specifically for providing the illegitimate samples. 
Take (Dhage et al., 2015; Gascon et al., 2014; Sen and Muralidharan, 2014) for example, instead of requesting the 
subjects recruited for providing the legitimate samples, the research team recruited additional subjects for providing 
the illegitimate samples. In this way, it is more likely to obtain a balanced number of the legitimate and the 
illegitimate samples. It is worth mentioning that, with this approach, for each increment of the subject size in a 
dataset, two subjects should be recruited. This means that the resource and the effort needed to obtain a dataset is 
doubled in comparison with the other two approaches. 
4.7. Public Dataset 
The availability of a public dataset for touch dynamics biometrics research is vital. For example, with such a 
dataset, we could do comparisons of different algorithms on the same dataset and/or different experimental settings. 
The availability of a public dataset also allows researchers to focus on more challenging research issues, spending 
less time on data acquisitions. However, the availability of open dataset in the domain of touch dynamics biometrics 
is still limited. This may be due to that touchscreen devices have not been with us for a very long time, and the 
creation or acquisition of such data is a time and resource consuming process. At the time of this writing, we are 
  
only able to find three public datasets in relation to touch dynamics. These datasets are summarized in Table II.  
Table II. The three public touch dynamics biometrics datasets 
 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
Input String Type Character-based Digit-based Character-based 
Subject Size 51 100 42 
Number of Sessions 3 5 2 
Session Interval 3-30 Days 1 Week - 
Input Sample Size/Session 5 2 30 
Total Acquisition Duration/Subject - 5 Weeks 2 Weeks 
Total Sample Size/Subject 15 10 51 
Separate Illegitimate Samples No Yes No 
 
Dataset 1: The data acquisition experiment conducted by (El-Abed et al., 2014) involved 51 subjects inputting a 
fixed character-based string “rhu.university” on a Nokia Lumia 920 windows smartphone. The subjects were 
required to attend 3 different sessions with an average inter-session interval of 5 days. The first session was used as 
a practice session, so the actual data acquisition commenced from the second session. A total of 15 samples were 
acquired from each subject over the second and third session. 
Dataset 2: Another dataset, published by (Tasia et al., 2014), was based on digit strings. The device used for 
acquiring the data was an early generation smartphone running on Android 2.0.1 (Éclair) API level 6, which was 
released in December 2009. Subjects were only required to provide 2 samples per session and 5 sessions were used 
with an inter-session interval of at least 1 week. Data were acquired in a confined classroom environment involving 
mostly university students. Input strings were not predefined; subjects were allowed to freely choose their PINs, 
most of which have the lengths of 4 to 8 digits.  
Dataset 3: Another related effort to acquire and share dataset publicly was made by (Antal and Szabó, 2014). The 
number of subjects involved is the smallest among the three public datasets. The data acquisition in this experiment 
was done by using a Nexus 7 tablet and a LG Optimus L7 P700 smartphone. The paper did not explain why two 
different device types were used and whether the use of different device types would have any performance 
implications. The input string used for the data acquisition was predefined as “.tie5Roanl”. Additionally, the touch 
events acquired include not only the input string but also shift key (toggle between lower and uppercase characters) 
and keyboard switch key (toggle between characters and digits keys). These secondary key events may capture 
valuable and distinctive information about a subject touch dynamics patterns. Also, in this experiment, most of the 
subjects provided their passwords 30 times each on 2 isolated sessions over a period of 2 weeks (the duration 
between the two sessions was unknown). Some invalid inputs were removed, so the dataset was unified to only 51 
input samples per subject (instead of 60 from both sessions).  
5. FEATURE EXTRACTION 
Human touch dynamics patterns contain unique features that can be used to distinguish one another. In feature 
extraction phase, these features are extracted by processing the raw touch dynamics data acquired from a subject. 
Common features discussed in literature can be classified into three categories, namely, (i) timing, (ii) spatial, and 
(iii) motion. The research efforts made on these features are summarized in Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 11. The numbers of publications on reporting different touch dynamics feature types  
 
5.1. Timing Feature (TM) 
The timing feature is the most widely used feature in touch dynamic biometrics. A touch event (finger touching 
down or lifting up) on a virtual keyboard generates digital interrupts that can be detected by the mobile OS API 
function calls (Kambourakis et al., 2014). Each of these events can be coupled with a timestamp value. These 
timestamp values do not have semantic meaning and need to be further manipulated. Based on these timestamp 
values, two different types of timing feature with varied lengths can be extracted.  
Timing Feature Types: By performing mathematical operations on two touch event timestamp values, two types 
of timing feature types can be obtained. The first one is the Dwell Time (DT), and it refers to the time duration of a 
touch event with the same key. It is also known as interval, press or hold time in literature. This value can be 
obtained by subtracting a key release timestamp value from its key press timestamp value. The second one is the 
Flight Time (FT). It refers to the time interval between the touch events of two successive keys. It is also known as 
latency. As shown in Fig. 12, there are four variants of FT. It is worth noting that, according to (Sheng et al., 2005), 
𝐹𝑇𝐴 may have a negative value. This scenario happens when a subject presses the next key before releasing the 
previous one. However, this scenario is more likely to happen when acquiring the timing feature using a computer 
keyboard rather than using a virtual keyboard. This is due to the difference in physical and geometrical size of 
virtual keys against physical keys; it is very rare for a subject to use multiple fingers simultaneously when providing 
their input on virtual keys. As a result, the chances of pressing the next key before releasing the previous one is 
significantly reduced or in some cases do not exist when using a virtual keyboard. 
 
Fig. 12. Timing Feature Types 
Timing Feature Length: A timing feature can be extracted with different feature lengths. The shortest feature 
length is known as uni-graph, which is the timing feature extracted by taking the touch event timestamp values of 
the same key. The timing features extracted from two or more keys are called di-graph and n-graph, respectively. A 
graphical illustration of the different n-graph lengths is shown in Fig. 13. In the majority of the experiments reported 
in literature, the uni-graph and di-graph are used. The only two exceptions were the experiments conducted by 
(Giuffrida et al., 2014; Trojahn et al., 2013), where the n-graph with the size of 3 or larger were extracted. The 
reason why a large n-graph size is not commonly used is that a larger n-graph contains a lower feature granularity 
(Trojahn et al., 2013). This has been experimentally proven by (Giuffrida et al., 2014). In their experiment, the 
authors compared the accuracy performances of different n-graph sizes. The comparison result showed that a larger 
n-graph size produces a lower accuracy performance. 
 
Fig. 13. The different timing feature lengths 
5.2. Spatial Feature (SP) 
A spatial feature is a characteristic associated with physical interactions between a fingertip and a device 
touchscreen surface, and it can be acquired when a touch event is performed. Three most commonly reported spatial 
features in literature are the touch size, pressure, and position. Visual examples of these three spatial features 
  
extracted using an Android mobile device are reported in (Y. Meng et al., 2014). 
Touch Size:  The touch size represents an approximation of the screen area being touched in a touch event. Each 
touch event is associated with a touch size value. The value is typically returned from an API function and is scaled 
to a value in the range between 0 and 1  (Zheng et al., 2014). This value is normally used as feature data without 
further manipulation. The touch size value captured from a subject is determined by the subject’s fingertip size. For 
example, the authors of (Nixon et al., 2014) observed that an adult male subject usually produces a larger touch size 
value than a child or an adult female subject. This means that it is hard for people with different fingertip sizes to 
mimic each other. 
Touch Pressure: The touch pressure is another feature that is often used along with the touch size. A touch 
pressure value measures the approximated force asserted on the screen upon each touch event. It is expressed in an 
abstract unit, with a value in the range between 0 (softer touch) and 1 (harder touch) (Zheng et al., 2014). Similar to 
the case for the touch size, a touch pressure value extracted by an API function can be used directly without further 
manipulation. A touch pressure value is linked to a subject’s finger muscle that is unique to each subject. Therefore, 
it is hard for one subject to imitate another subject’s touch pressure purely by observations, making a touch 
dynamics authentication system that uses touch pressure feature highly resistant to shoulder surfing attacks (Feng et 
al., 2013). 
Touch Position: The touch position is a two-dimensional matrix feature that captures a fingertip landing location 
on a device screen (or key). Each touch event can be associated with an x and y-coordinate measured in pixel units 
(Kolly et al., 2012). The touch position of a key varies with a subject’s fingertip size and cognitive preference. This 
variation allows the touch position to be used as a discriminative feature to identify a subject. This is further 
supported by the observations reported by (Johansen, 2012), where the touch positions provided by different 
subjects are highly different among different subjects in their experiment. The touch position can be expressed using 
two different ways (i) as the absolute coordinates of a touch event relative to the entire screen (Y. Meng et al., 
2014), or (ii) as an offset to the center of a key used (Draffin et al., 2014). Also, by some mathematical 
manipulations, additional features can be derived. These include the distance (Buschek et al., 2015; Kambourakis et 
al., 2014), speed (Kambourakis et al., 2014), or angle (Serwadda et al., 2013), between two touch events. However, 
there is a concern with this coordinate representation of touch position values (Alotaibi et al., 2014), that is, the 
coordinate system of a screen is device dependent. Using different devices, the captured touch position values are 
not consistent. Therefore, touch position values should be normalized, unless data acquisition operation is conducted 
on a device with a similar model (Jain et al., 2014).  
5.3. Motion Feature (MO) 
Modern mobile devices are embedded with two hardware motion sensors, the accelerometer and the gyroscope. 
These sensors have been widely used in applications, such as device pairing and sleep cycle monitoring applications, 
that make use of movement data or are movement dependent (Owusu et al., 2012). Each touch event usually inflicts 
a small amount of movement and/or rotation to the device. These motion features can be captured and used to 
identify a subject. 
The accelerometer sensor measures the linear movement rate applied to a device over time. It is designed to detect 
the movement along the x, y, and z-axis in both positive and negative directions. These three values are measured in 
the unit of  𝑚/𝑠2 (Aviv et al., 2012). On the other hand, the gyroscope sensor measures the rotation rate applied to a 
device against the three axes: (i) tilt forward and backward (Pitch), (ii) twist from side to side (Roll), and (iii) turn 
from portrait to landscape (Yaw). These values are measured in the unit of 𝑟𝑎𝑑/𝑠 (Giuffrida et al., 2014). Fig. 14 
shows a graphical representation of the different motions captured by both sensors. 
 
Fig. 14. The different motion data captured by different mobile sensors 
Normally, raw motion data obtained from these two sensors are not readily usable as feature data. This is because 
each touch event generates more than one movement and rotation values. To make the data usable as feature data, 
we should apply some statistical computations, such as min, max, mean and variance, on the raw data, and the 
results of these computations can be used as meaningful feature data (de Mendizabal-Vazquez et al., 2014; Ho, 
2013). Also, as (Zheng et al., 2014) pointed out, both sensors are sensitive to tiny movement changes. Therefore, 
they chose to combine sensor values of x, y and z-axis into a vector of feature, instead of using them individually. 
Researchers are divided as whether the accelerometer sensor actually provides a better discriminative property or 
the gyroscope sensor. For example, the experimental results from (Giuffrida et al., 2014) show that the 
accelerometer data can better capture a subject’s touch dynamics patterns than the gyroscope data. However, the 
observations made by (Cai and Chen, 2012) show a different result, i.e. the gyroscope data provide a better 
accuracy, especially if a subject uses the device while moving. In literature, a majority of the touch dynamics motion 
feature data are from both types of sensors. This is good because data from both types of sensors may complement 
each other, leading to a better accuracy in identifying a subject. 
6. DECISION MAKING 
Decision making is an operation carried out to determine if the touch dynamics patterns submitted by a subject is 
indeed originated from the target subject. This decision is made by comparing the similarity or dissimilarity score 
generated from a machine learning technique against a predefined threshold. A number of such techniques have 
been used in touch dynamics research reported in literature, namely, (i) Probabilistic Modeling, (ii) Cluster Analysis, 
(iii) Decision Tree, (iv) Support Vector Machine, (v) Neural Network, (vi) Distance Measure, and (vii) Statistical. 
Fig. 15 summarizes the machine learning techniques against the number of papers that adopted them in touch 
dynamics research. 
 
Fig. 15. Machine learning techniques vs the number of papers that employed them  
Probabilistic Modeling (PM): The main idea behind the probabilistic modeling technique is to predict the 
likelihood of a given test sample belonging to a particular subject using the prior probability calculated from training 
samples (touch dynamics data acquired during user enrollment phase). One widely used probabilistic modeling 
technique is the Bayesian Network (Feng et al., 2013; Saravanan et al., 2014). It uses an acyclic graph model to find 
the probabilistic relationship between parent and child node (Antal and Szabó, 2014). For example, feature data 
from a reference template will be used as the parent node and the associated subject identity as a child node. Then, 
given a test sample (touch dynamics data acquired during user authentication phase), the intended child node is 
determined by the probability of the parent node (Jeanjaitrong and Bhattarakosol, 2013). Other variants of the 
probabilistic modeling technique include the Naive Bayes (Buschek et al., 2015; Crawford et al., 2013) and the 
Gaussian Probability Density Function (Mahnoush Babaeizadeh et al., 2014). 
Cluster Analysis (CA): The cluster analysis technique assumes that samples belonging to the same subject have 
similar properties (Meng et al., 2013). The goal is to group sample with similar properties to form a homogeneous 
cluster. Then, the label of a test sample is decided by the degree of proximity towards a cluster (Antal and Szabó, 
2014). Samples from different clusters are highly dissimilar but very similar among the samples in the same cluster. 
There are variants of the cluster analysis technique, including the K-means (Trojahn et al., 2013), K-Star (Sen and 
Muralidharan, 2014; Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013) and k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) (Buschek et al., 2015; Crawford 
et al., 2013; Giuffrida et al., 2014). 
Decision Tree (DT): The decision tree technique is popular and used in many areas. It is well known for its low 
computational complexity (Antal and Szabó, 2014). This technique is particularly suitable for classification 
problems that involve a small number of output labels. For example, in the case of touch dynamics authentication, it 
is often used to check whether a test sample is legitimate or not. The J48 (Y. Meng et al., 2014; Saravanan et al., 
2014; Sen and Muralidharan, 2014; Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013) and the Random Forest (RF) (Feng et al., 2013; 
  
Kambourakis et al., 2014; Saravanan et al., 2014) are the two widely used decision tree techniques in touch 
dynamics research. The main objective of these techniques is to create a tree-like model that predicts the class label 
of a given test sample based on previously known training samples. A decision tree is constructed by continuously 
splitting feature data into subsets so that the information gain ratio at each node of the tree is maximized. This 
iterative process stops when a node has only a single label, or when further splitting a tree node no longer provides 
additional information gain. The RF differs from the J48 in that it adds a randomized procedure in the process of 
splitting each tree node (Antal and Szabó, 2014). The experimental results reported in (Feng et al., 2013; Serwadda 
et al., 2013) show that the RF performs better than the J48 in classifying subject touch dynamics patterns. However, 
it requires a longer time to formulate a decision tree (Kambourakis et al., 2014). When using a decision tree 
technique, considerations should be given to prevent over-fitting the tree, which could result in a higher level of 
computational complexity and a lower level of performance.  
Support Vector Machine (SVM): The Support Vector Machine is another technique commonly used in many 
biometrics studies (Gascon et al., 2014; Jain et al., 2014). The fundamental concept of this technique is to first 
determine how two classes of feature data differ from each other and then create a boundary that best separate them. 
Having this boundary, subsequent test samples can be classified as either legitimate or illegitimate according to 
which side of the boundary they are located. The search for this boundary can be performed within a 2-dimensional 
hyperplane using a linear kernel (separating) function. However, distinguishing the touch dynamics patterns between 
legitimate and illegitimate subjects are non-linear in nature (Xu et al., 2014). A non-linear kernel function such as 
Radial Basis Function (Antal and Szabó, 2014; Serwadda et al., 2013) can be used to map feature data onto a higher 
dimensional feature space, to create more complex boundaries that can optimally split both classes (i.e. legitimate 
and illegitimate). As a result, it can more accurately determine which side of the feature space a test sample belongs.  
Neural Network (NN): The neural network technique simulates the information processing structure of 
biological neurons. Typically, a neural network architecture consists of three interconnected layers (the input, hidden 
and output layer). To start with, the feature data from all subjects are fed into the input layer of the network as a set 
of neurons. An activation function is used to assign weights to each neuron. Then, the information of the activated 
neurons is passed from one to another within the hidden layer. This process iterates until an output is produced. 
Finally, based on the output values a learning process is used to update the weights of each neuron in the hidden 
layer to improve the network. Some commonly used neural network techniques are Radial Basis Function networks 
(RBFN) (Meng et al., 2013; Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013) and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) (Antal and Szabó, 
2014; Sen and Muralidharan, 2014; Serwadda et al., 2013). A neural network generally produces a higher level of 
accuracy in identifying a subject but is more computationally expensive, (Draffin et al., 2014) and more time 
consuming to be used (de Mendizabal-Vazquez et al., 2014). According to (Kambourakis et al., 2014), it is 
impractical to run on mobile devices with less than 512MB of memory. 
Distance Measure (DM): The distance measure technique calculates a dissimilarity or similarity score between a 
test sample and the training sample of a given subject. The score is then compared against a threshold to determine if 
the test sample belongs to the target subject. Most frequently used distance measure techniques include Euclidean 
(Crawford et al., 2013; de Mendizabal-Vazquez et al., 2014; Samura et al., 2014; Sen and Muralidharan, 2014), 
Manhattan (Ho, 2013; Johansen, 2012; Serwadda et al., 2013), Mahalanobis (Antal and Szabó, 2014; Giuffrida et 
al., 2014) and Bhattacharyya (Wolff, 2013). 
Statistical (ST): There are several statistical techniques that have been used in biometrics research. These 
techniques include the mean and standard deviation (Tasia et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2014) and the deviation 
tolerance (Dhage et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2012). There are a number of advantages associated with these 
techniques. For example in comparison with the techniques discussed above, they are less complex and easy to 
implement, cost less computational time, and consume less resource such as battery power. These advantages are 
important for resource-limited mobile devices. 
7. FUSION 
Fusion is an approach used to combine information from multiple sources to improve the accuracy performance 
of a biometrics authentication method. The multiple sources may be from multiple features or by using multiple 
machine learning techniques. The information from these sources may be combined at three different stages, which 
are, respectively, referred to as (i) Feature Level Fusion, (ii) Score Level Fusion, and (iii) Decision Level Fusion. 
Feature Level Fusion (FLF): The feature level fusion is the most used fusion approach in touch dynamics 
research. The fusion approach involves concatenating more than one feature data into a single feature vector and is 
performed before the template generation or the data classification operation. Fusion may be performed on feature 
data acquired from the same (Jeanjaitrong and Bhattarakosol, 2013) or different sensors (Giuffrida et al., 2014; 
Zheng et al., 2014). Although feature level fusion is simple to implement and it enables the utilization of additional 
properties of multiple feature data, it can result in an overly large joint feature vector known as the curse of 
dimensionality (Shi et al., 2011). Some machine learning techniques, such as decision tree, may not work well with 
a high dimensional feature vector (Shimshon et al., 2010). Therefore, the number of feature data fused may 
influence the selection of machine learning technique. 
Score Level Fusion (SLF): The score level fusion, unlike the feature level fusion, is performed after the data 
classification operation. For example, in (Samura et al., 2014), two different machine learning techniques (the 
Weighted Euclidean Distance and the Array Disorder) were used independently on one set of feature data, resulting 
in two matching scores, one from each machine learning technique. The two scores are then combined into a single 
score for decision making. Methods such as the sum, weighted-sum, or product rules are commonly used to combine 
multiple scores (Dhage et al., 2015). If the scores from different machine learning techniques are not comparable, 
they will need to be normalized prior to fusion (Tresadern et al., 2013). 
Decision Level Fusion (DLF): The decision level fusion is the least complex among the three fusion approaches. 
It requires minimum changes being applied to the internal structure of each data classification algorithm. Fusion is 
performed by combining decisions (accept or reject) made by multiple machine learning techniques using voting 
rules, such as the AND or OR rules (Dhage et al., 2015). 
8. DATA ADAPTATION 
Human touch dynamics, unlike physiological biometrics (e.g. fingerprint or iris), are not permanent and are likely 
to evolve over time. After some time, a subject’s reference template (generated using samples acquired during 
enrollment phase) may no longer reflect the subject’s most recent touch dynamics patterns. One way to deal with 
this issue is by introducing an adaptation component. The component uses the most recent touch dynamics patterns 
to update the reference template of the subject, allowing gradual adjustment of the reference template based on the 
touch dynamics pattern changes.  
To control unintended or unnecessary changes imposed on a reference template, two different policies can be used 
(Crawford et al., 2013), e.g., selecting samples from different input instances or mixing the most recent samples with 
a portion of the existing template samples. These policies can reduce the effect of short-term pattern changes of the 
legitimate subjects or prevent unauthorized modifications made to reference template by the illegitimate subjects. 
Although the adaptation component requires additional computation time and resource, if implemented correctly, 
it may not degrade device performance, reduce battery life span or affect usage experience. For example, an 
adaptation module can be executed during the period when the execution of the component have the least effect on a 
device (e.g. when the device is in the standby mode or is plugged into a power source for recharging, or when the 
processor is idle) (Crawford et al., 2013). 
9. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section provides an overview of the performances achieved by related works, i.e. touch dynamics 
authentication reported in literature. For the sake of clarity, the performances are discussed based on the 
authentication modes that they support, static or dynamic modes, input string lengths used, feature discriminative 
capabilities, fusion approaches used, and the system overheads they each impose. 
9.1. Static Mode 
In the static mode, the identity of a subject is verified based on the input provided by the subject on the first 
instance of accessing a system. This is the first line of protection and also the most commonly seen security 
protection measure deployed on mobile devices. According to our literature research, character-based and digit-
based passcodes are the most used input types in the static mode. 
To test the viability of integrating touch dynamics biometrics with password, (Kambourakis et al., 2014) has 
conducted experiments to acquire passwords using touch dynamics from 20 subjects. The password is a predefined 
alphanumeric character string (“7q56n5ll44”). To acquire each password string, a subject is required to move their 
finger from one side of the device to the other to complete the input by touching on different keys on the 
touchscreen keyboard. The feature extraction was performed using two different methods, individual key-based 
extraction and overall key-based extraction. With the first method, the feature values of every single touched key are 
extracted and analyzed by the classifier. With the second method, the average feature value of all the touched keys is 
calculated before analyzed by the classifier. Experimental results show that regardless of the classifiers used, the 
first method always outperforms the second. This is because more fine-grained information can be captured in the 
feature value of individual touched key than the average feature value of all touched keys. 
  
(Sen and Muralidharan, 2014) attempt to use touch dynamics biometrics to enhance digit-based passcode (PIN). 
In the experiment, 10 subjects were asked to provide 100 input samples of a predefined PIN (“1593”) each. Using 
the Multi-Layer Perceptron classifier, legitimate subjects were able to be correctly classified up to 86% of the time 
(FRR 14%). The FAR test was conducted somewhat differently. Two additional subjects were recruited (acting as 
an attacker) to imitate the PIN input pattern of the all the 10 legitimate subjects. To facilitate the impersonation 
attempt, the two attackers were given a visualization tool. The tool is designed to reveal the correct timing and 
pressure information of each digit of the PIN input of the legitimate subjects. Even by deliberately exposing the 
timing and pressure feature data of the PIN, the authors were still able to archive an FAR of 16%. 
As can be seen from Table III, the work by (Jeanjaitrong and Bhattarakosol, 2013) is the only one that uses a 
symbolic passcode instead of a character-based or digit-based passcode. The symbolic passcode consisted of spade, 
heart, diamond, and club. Each of the symbols can be represented in 4 different colors. A total of 16 symbols 
arranged in a 4x4 matrix block were designed as the input screen layout. To control the screen size inequality of 
different mobile devices, the data acquisition tool is developed as a web application so that the input screen layout 
can automatically scale to the screen size of different mobile devices. An accuracy performance of 82.18% was 
achieved by employing the Bayesian Network to classify the timing and spatial feature of the 10 subjects. 
Table III. The research works conducted in static mode 
Study 
Subject 
Size 
Input 
Type 
Input 
Length 
Feature Method EER (%) 
(Dhage et al., 2015) 15 C 10 TM ST 0.806 
(Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013) 16 C 11 TM, SP DT 2.03^, 2.67# 
(Kambourakis et al., 2014) 20 C 10 TM, SP DT 26 
(Giuffrida et al., 2014) 20 C 8-9 TM, MO DM 0.08 
(Bond and E.A., 2015) 25 C 34 TM NN 9.3 
(Buschek et al., 2015) 28 C 6-8 TM, SP PM 21.02 
(Huang et al., 2012) 40 C 11 TM ST 7.5 
(Antal and Szabó, 2014) 42 C 10 TM, SP DM 12.9 
(Sen and Muralidharan, 2014) 10 D 4 TM, SP NN 15.2 
(Jain et al., 2014) 30 D 10 TM, SP SVM 2.8 
(Ho, 2013) 55 D 4 TM, SP, MO SVM 4.4^, 5.3# 
(de Mendizabal-Vazquez et al., 2014) 80 D 4 TM, SP, MO DM 20 
(Zheng et al., 2014) 80 D 4 TM, SP, MO ST 3.65 
(Tasia et al., 2014) 100 D 4-10 TM, SP ST 8.4 
(Wu and Chen, 2015) 100 D 8 TM, SP, MO SVM 0.556 
(Trojahn et al., 2013) 152 D 17 TM, SP CA 4.19^, 4.59# 
(Jeanjaitrong and Bhattarakosol, 2013) 10 O 4 TM, SP NN 82.18* 
C: Character; D: Digit; O: Other 
*Accuracy; ^FAR; #FRR 
9.2. Dynamic Mode 
In the dynamic mode, a subject’s identity is continuously verified throughout the active session of a mobile 
device. An authentication deployed in the dynamics mode can detect unrecognized touch dynamics patterns when a 
subject’s mobile device is used by someone else. Once any unrecognized touch dynamics patterns are detected, 
restriction to sensitive application can be imposed and/or additional reauthentication request can be triggered. To 
authenticate a subject in the dynamic mode, a longer input string is normally required than in the static mode. The 
longer input string is commonly acquired by researchers using three different ways (i) requiring subject to input a 
long input string, (ii) accumulating touch events over a predefined period of time, or (iii) setting a predefined 
number of touch events to accumulate. 
(Feng et al., 2013) attempt to identify a subject based on the character strings commonly used in emails and chat 
messages. It is noted that storing feature data of each character combination of the character string may impose 
system overhead on a mobile device. Therefore, only the 40 most frequently used English language character 
combinations were stored and used for analysis. The subjects input were analyzed through a series of character 
strings with the lengths of 20, 40 and 60. If the touch dynamics patterns within the character string are unrecognized, 
the subject is declared as an impersonator and a reauthentication request will be invoked. The result shows that the 
best accuracy performance achieved was 1% EER by using the random forest classifier based on a 40 character 
string. The author also suggested that for authentication in the dynamic mode, maintaining high usability is the 
highest priority. This means that achieving a low FRR value is important. 
The experiment conducted by (Gascon et al., 2014) is rather different from the one discussed above, as in the 
input strings are some predefined 160 characters pangrams (words or sentences containing every letter of the 
alphabet at least once). One example given was “the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog”. The reason for 
using pangrams is to ensure that all characters on the virtual keyboard are used at least once. As shown in Table IV, 
the number of subjects recruited in the experiment is the largest (315 subjects) among the research works conducted 
in the dynamic mode. The FRR test was conducted somewhat differently, among all the 315 subjects’ samples, only 
12 subjects’ samples were used to calculate the FRR value, with the remaining 303 subjects’ sample used for the 
FAR test. An accuracy performance of 1% FAR and 18% FRR was obtained by using a support vector machine 
classifier with the linear separating function. 
Data acquisition operation conducted by (Y. Meng et al., 2014) did not use a predefined input string. Data 
acquired was in the form of touch events generated by these routine activities. For example, subjects were requested 
to use an Android smartphone to perform their usual activity, such as text messaging and web browsing. Unlike their 
previous study (Meng et al., 2013), where a 10-minute session was used to acquire touch events, their latest study 
predefined a fixed number of touch events to be acquired in each data acquisition session. The changes were made 
because of the number of touch events acquired by using the time-based session were unpredictable. The latter 
approach was able to supply a more consistent and sufficient number of touch events for analysis, and thus improves 
the effectiveness of the experiment. In the experiment, the performances of five different classifiers were compared. 
The results show that the radial basis function network achieved the best EER of 2.46%. 
Table IV. The research works conducted in dynamic authentication mode 
Study 
Subject 
Size 
Input Length 
Input 
Freedom 
Method EER (%) 
(Kolly et al., 2012) 5 15 touch events Yes PM 80* 
(Wolff, 2013) 6 15 min touch events - DM 83* 
(Draffin et al., 2014) 13 6000 touch events Yes NN 86* 
(Meng et al., 2013) 20 10 min touch events Yes NN 2.92 
(Xu et al., 2014) 32 5 min touch events No SVM <10 
(Feng et al., 2013) 40 14-53 Characters No DT 1 
(Y. Meng et al., 2014) 50 120 touch events Yes NN 2.46 
(Shen et al., 2015) 51 800 touch events Yes SVM <8 
(Serwadda et al., 2013) 190 80 touch events No PM ~13.8 
(Gascon et al., 2014) 315 160 Characters No SVM 1^, 8# 
*Accuracy; ^FAR; #FRR 
9.3. Input String Length 
Previous studies suggested that the input string length has a direct relationship with the accuracy performance of a 
classifier. For example, the experiment conducted by (Zheng et al., 2014) compared the accuracy performance 
between a 4-digit and a 8-digit PIN. The dissimilarity scores between the legitimate and the illegitimate subjects 
have been calculated and plotted in a frequency distribution graph. The authors discovered a clear gap in the 
dissimilarity scores graph of the 8-digit PIN, but an overlap for the 4-digit PIN. This shows that the longer the PIN 
the better it is at representing a subject touch dynamics patterns, and the higher the accuracy performance of the 
classifier. A likely explanation is that the 8-digit PIN is two times the length of the 4-digit PIN and has twice as 
many features as the 4-digit PIN, allowing it to hold more information about a subject touch dynamics patterns.  
The above study was not the only one that reported the correlation between the input length and the accuracy 
performance of a classifier. (Draffin et al., 2014) also discovered that by increasing the number of touch events 
(from 5 to 15) used for data classification, the accuracy performance can be improved by 27%. Table V shows 
similar observation by other research works. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table V. The accuracy performance of short and long input string lengths 
Study 
Working 
Mode 
Input 
Type 
Input 
Length 
EER (%) Improvement (%) 
(Kambourakis et al., 2014) Static C 
10 26 
+47.69 
47 13.6 
(Samura et al., 2014) Static C 
200 90.7* 
+5.51 
300 95.7 
(Zheng et al., 2014) Static D 
4 5.98 
+24.75 
8 4.5 
(Chang et al., 2015) Static D 
6 23 
+21.74 
10 18 
(Feng et al., 2013) Dynamic C 
20 8.93^, 5.6# 
+88.8, +46.43 
40 1, 3 
(Draffin et al., 2014) Dynamic O 
5 67.7* 
+27.03 
15 86 
C: Character; D: Digit; O: Other 
*Accuracy; ^FAR; #FRR 
9.4. Feature Discriminative Capability 
The timing feature has been the most frequently used feature since the early stage of keystroke dynamics research 
(predecessor to touch dynamics). More recent mobile devices are embedded with various sensors that are capable of 
providing additional features that can be used to describe a subject’s touch dynamics patterns. It is interesting to 
compare the discriminative capabilities of these new features (i.e. the spatial feature and the motion feature) against 
the timing feature. 
In the experiment conducted by (Buschek et al., 2015), the spatial feature, such as the touch size, pressure, and 
position were extracted from the touchscreen sensor of a mobile device. The result shows that these spatial features 
always perform better than the timing feature in most of the experimental settings. The best EER was obtained using 
the touch location and the touch size feature, and it was approximately 14% better than the timing feature.  
The motion feature extracted from the motion sensor provides additional movement information that can be used 
to describe a touch event performed by a subject on a mobile device. The experiment conducted by (Giuffrida et al., 
2014) reported that the EER of their proposed method was markedly reduced from 4.97% (by using the timing 
feature) to 0.08% after using the motion feature. This shows that the motion feature provides richer discriminative 
capability than the timing feature.  
Table VI clearly shows that some of the features perform better than the other. However, this does not mean that 
the lower performed features are not useful. This is because each feature data type captures a different aspect of the 
subjects touch dynamics patterns (Zheng et al., 2014). Studies (Buschek et al., 2015; Samura et al., 2014) suggested 
that by combining multiple features (using fusion approach), the accuracy performance of the classifier can be 
further improved (further discussions in the following section).  
Table VI. The accuracy performance of different feature data types 
Study Input String 
EER (%) 
Better off by (%) 
Timing Spatial Motion 
(Samura et al., 2014) 300 Character 39* 38 - +2.56 
(Buschek et al., 2015) 6-8 Character 21.75 18.65 - +14.25 
(Jain et al., 2014) 10-Digit 10.5 3.5 - +66.67 
(Zheng et al., 2014) 16-Digit 16.5 11.5 15 +30.03 (Timing), +30.43 (Motion) 
(Wu and Chen, 2015) 8-Digit 71.3* 69.03 98.26 +37.81 (Timing), +42.34 (Spatial) 
(Giuffrida et al., 2014) 8 Character 4.97 - 0.08 +98.39 
Note: Best performed feature highlighted in green and bold. 
*Accuracy 
 
9.5. Fusion 
To increase the overall accuracy performance, researchers have attempted to use different fusion approaches. For 
example, (Zheng et al., 2014) suggested that different feature captures a different aspect of a touch dynamics 
patterns, and combining them allows a subject’s touch dynamics patterns to be more precisely represented. To prove 
this assumption, the authors conducted four experiments using four features (i) acceleration (motion), (ii) pressure 
(spatial), (iii) size (spatial) and (iii) time (timing). When the features are used individually, each of the features 
obtained the EER of 19%, 12%, 25%, and 21%, respectively, whereas, when all four features are used together, the 
EER has decreased to 4.5%. This shows that using the combination of all features produces a better result than using 
the features individually. 
As has been discussed in the section above, there are three different types of fusion approaches. We can use more 
than one of the approaches simultaneously to improve the accuracy performance of a classifier. For example, 
(Samura et al., 2014) uses both the feature level fusion and the decision level fusion approaches in their experiment. 
To start with, they first combined different types of feature extracted from a 300 character input text (feature level 
fusion). Then, the individual score produced by two different data classification techniques (Weighted Euclidean 
Distance and Array Disorder) are combined (decision level fusion) to collectively make an authentication decision. 
The accuracy performance was successfully improved from 55% (before fusion) to 95.7% (after fusion).  
Table VII summarizes the research work in touch dynamics biometrics that uses different fusion approaches. All 
of the experiments shows an improved in accuracy performance after applying fusion approach. 
Table VII. The accuracy performance before and after applying the fusion approach(s) 
Study Input Fusion 
EER (%) 
Improvement 
(%) 
Before 
Fusion 
After 
Fusion 
(Jeanjaitrong and Bhattarakosol, 2013) Symbol FLF 62.64* 82.18 +31.19 
(Zheng et al., 2014) 8-Digit FLF 12 4.5 +62.5 
(Trojahn et al., 2013) 17-Digit FLF 9.28^, 6.72# 4.19, 4.59 +54.8, +31.7 
(Jain et al., 2014) 10-Digit FLF 3.5 2.8 +20 
(Wu and Chen, 2015) 8-Digit FLF 98.26* 99.17 +0.93 
(Buschek et al., 2015) 6-8 Char FLF 18.65 13.74 +26.33 
(Antal and Szabó, 2015) 10 Char FLF 6.6 3.1 +53.03 
(Feng et al., 2013) 4 Char FLF 17.8^, 60# 10.4, 11.1 +41.57, +81.5 
(Samura et al., 2014) 300 Char FLF, SLF 55* 95.7 +74 
(Dhage et al., 2015) 10 Char SLF, DLF 4.032 0.806 +80 
*Accuracy; ^FAR; #FRR 
9.6. System Overhead 
The accuracy performance has been the primary evaluation metric for a touch dynamics authentication. 
Nevertheless, system overhead in terms of computational speed and resource consumption is also an important 
evaluation criterion. The lower the system overhead of a proposed authentication method, the less the impact it has 
on the performance of a mobile device (Meng et al., 2013). The trade-off between these two metrics was normally 
not reported. This is because only a small number of research work (13%) conducted both the data acquisition and 
the data classification operation on a mobile device. Most of the research work conducted the data classification 
operation on a desktop computer. 
To evaluate the computational speed and the resource consumption of a proposed method, one has to implement 
both the data acquisition and data classification operation on a mobile device. For example, (Kambourakis et al., 
2014) conducted their experiment entirely on a Sony Ericsson Xperia smartphone. The Random Forest (RF) and the 
k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) techniques were implemented to identify subjects based on a 47 character input string. 
The experimental result shows that the k-NN not only achieve a better EER but also consumes relatively the same 
amount of computational time, memory, and CPU resource than the RF. 
The number of features used to represent a subject’s touch dynamics patterns can also influence the computational 
time and the resource consumption of a mobile device. The more the number of features used to represent a 
subject’s touch dynamics patterns, the more the computational time and the resource consumption incurred by a 
mobile device. Ideally, one would want to minimize the number of features used and yet maintaining a reasonable 
accuracy performance. This has been shown in an experiment conducted by (Y. Meng et al., 2014), where, even 
when the number of features was reduced from 37 to 8, the accuracy performance was maintained at a reasonable 
  
level. By reducing the number of features used, the computational time and the resource consumption has been 
reduced. 
10. OPEN PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Optimal Input Length: In general, the longer the input length the better the accuracy performance of a touch 
dynamics authentication system. However, the increase in the length of an input reduces the usability (in the static 
mode) and the security (in the dynamic mode) of the authentication system in different ways. In the case of the static 
mode, the longer the input length (or passcode), the harder it is for the subject to remember the longer passcode, thus 
reducing the usability. In the case of the dynamic mode (continuous authentication), the longer the input length, the 
more the time (to acquire more inputs) is required by the authentication system before making an authentication 
decision. This potentially allows an illegitimate user to use a device longer (duration) before being detected, thus 
reducing the security. Present continuous authentication in literature are carried out in the form of a periodic 
authentication mode, where the users are reauthenticated based on a block of fixed number of inputs (Feng et al., 
2013) or a collection of inputs over a fixed period of time (Y. Meng et al., 2014). This method has a limitation, that 
is, if the system could detect an illegitimate user before the fixed number of inputs is acquired, then there is no 
reason to allow the illegitimate user to have continued access to the device. A realistic continuous authentication 
should take each input into consideration immediately when making an authentication decision or make sure that the 
authentication time is as short as possible. One possible way to address this problem is to use the streaming classifier 
such as (Abdulsalam et al., 2011) and (Gaber et al., 2007), by which we may be able to use a lesser amount of inputs 
to make a quicker authentication decision with an acceptable level of accuracy performance. 
Feature Data Selection: In general, the more the number of feature data is used to represent the subject’s touch 
dynamics patterns, the higher the accuracy performance of the classifier, and the more effective the authentication 
method (Alghamdi and Elrefaei, 2015). However, it is usually undesirable to use all of the available feature data as 
input for a classifier, because of three reasons (i) using more feature data to train and test a classifier will result in 
more processing time and CPU overhead (W. Meng et al., 2014), (ii) storing more feature data will be costlier in 
terms of memory efficiency (Zheng et al., 2014), and (iii) not all of the feature data offer the same degree of 
discriminative capability; some of the feature data provide higher degree of discriminative capability, and so is more 
important than the other. To address this problem, a feature selection process can be used to choose a smaller subset 
of feature data that contains only the most important feature data. The feature selection process can be implemented 
using algorithms such as (Ververidis and Kotropoulos, 2009) and (Peng et al., 2005). The discriminative capability 
of the selected feature data can be evaluated by its intra-class and inter-class variations. This can be quantitatively 
assessed by using the intra-class and inter-class distribution to show their degree of separations (discriminative 
capabilities). 
Unary Classifier vs. Binary Classifier: The primary input to for a data classification operation (to build a data 
classification model) for a touch dynamics authentication system is the user's touch dynamics pattern samples. The 
samples are often associated with the user class label (i.e. legitimate or illegitimate class). Therefore, the data 
classification algorithms can be categorized into two types based on the class label of the samples they use to build a 
model, namely, (i) Unary classifier, which uses only the samples from a single class (i.e. only the legitimate user 
samples), and (ii) Binary classifier, which uses the samples from all the classes (i.e. both the legitimate and the 
illegitimate user samples), to build a model.  
The binary classifiers have been the norm for building data classification models (Bellinger et al., 2012). 
However, in some practical cases, the samples of a particular class outnumbered the others or only the samples from 
a single class are available. In such imbalanced cases, the binary classifiers may not perform well, as they rely on 
samples from all classes to build a model that separates the different classes apart (Bellinger et al., 2012). This is the 
case for a touch dynamics authentication on a mobile device, where a mobile device is a highly personal device 
(rarely shared between multiple users), so obtaining the illegitimate user samples is not easy in practice. In this case, 
using the unary classifiers to build a model may be a better option. A unary classifier uses only a single class to 
build a model, so the model creation is not affected by the imbalanced dataset. Additionally, the time taken to build 
the model is shorter, as a lesser number of samples are used to train the classifier. Algorithms such as the one-class 
support vector machine (Manevitz and Yousef, 2002) and the density and probability estimates (Hempstalk et al., 
2008) can be used to implement a unary classification model. The effectiveness of using the unary classifiers over 
the binary classifiers for touch dynamics authentication is still not clearly evaluated and is open for future 
investigation. 
 
Larger Form Factor: A subject’s touch dynamics patterns may vary when providing their input on the mobile 
device of different sizes. This variation can be exploited to achieve a better accuracy performance. For example, 
(Saravanan et al., 2014) shows that the accuracy performance is higher when the inputs are acquired on a 7-inch 
mobile device than when they are acquired on a 4.7-inch version. The better performance can be attributed to a 
higher variation in touch dynamics patterns on the device with a larger screen size. If this assumption is true, and 
given that the average size of the mobile devices in the market is getting bigger year after year (Ben Taylor, 2014), 
then the viability of implementing a touch dynamics authentication system on future mobile devices is promising. 
The majority of the devices used in touch dynamics biometrics literature are smartphones (approximately 5-inch or 
less). To understand the impact of the different device sizes on the accuracy performance, devices with larger screen 
size, such as a 10-inch digital tablet or beyond (table-top or touchscreen panel) should be used in future studies. 
Continuous Identification: Although there is an increasing number of literature about the use of touch dynamics 
biometrics for continuous authentication, there are still limited works on the study of touch dynamics biometrics in 
the context of continuous identification on mobile devices. In some application scenario, e.g., a mobile device 
sharing scenario, the continuous identification may be a better choice than the continuous authentication. This can 
be explained using the case as follows. When a mobile device is shared with a guest, often, the identity of the guest 
is not known or predetermined. So establishing a credential (e.g. an ID and a PIN for verification) for the unknown 
guest could be troublesome and impractical. Without an established credential for the guest, revalidating the guest’s 
identity could be difficult to perform in the continuous authentication. In such a scenario, the continuous 
identification (one-to-many matching) could be a better option.  
A continuous identification can be implemented on a mobile device in such a way that when a guest is observed, a 
privacy protection mechanism (PPM) will be activated automatically. The PPM protects and prevents unauthorized 
or unintentional access or modification to the owner’s data, files, and system settings. After the guest leaves and the 
device returns to the owner’s possession, the PPM will be deactivated, returning the full access privilege of the 
device back to the owner. If an impersonator is detected, the mobile device will be locked and/or alert the owner 
through email.  
Implementing an effective and robust continuous identification in a mobile device is not easy. Unlike the other 
biometrics identification systems (e.g. forensic investigations or intrusion detections) that involve searching for a 
matched identity over a large number of subjects/classes, the identification task in a mobile device is usually limited 
to three classes, i.e. the owner, guest, and impersonator. Despite the much smaller number of classes involved, 
which may seem to have reduced the complexity of the identification task, two problems still exist (i) the touch 
dynamics data for the owner need to be incrementally accumulated and (ii) the touch dynamics data for the guest 
and the impersonator are often very limited or even unavailable and so the owner/guest/impersonator data 
classification operation is rather difficult. This makes training the classifier to perform continuous identification a 
challenging problem. Therefore, how to devise a proper, robust, and effective continuous identification module 
deserves more attention in future work. 
Cross-Session Performance Evaluation: In contrast with other physiological biometrics, which produces a more 
stable pattern across different acquisition sessions (e.g. the iris, face or fingerprint pattern), the touch dynamics 
patterns acquired from different sessions have a certain degree of variations from one to the other. These variations 
occur because the touch dynamics patterns can be affected by behavioral variability. The source of behavioral 
variability comes from several factors such as the (i) cognitive factor (e.g. increasing familiarity with the operations 
or input methods of a device), (ii) psychological factor (e.g. tiredness, anger, or distressed), (iii) physiological factor 
(e.g. sickness or injury), or (iv) environmental factor (e.g. distraction or position when using the device). It is 
imperative to find out whether the touch dynamics patterns variabilities between different sessions may have any 
implications to the accuracy performance of a touch dynamics authentication system. To conduct such a study, the 
data should be acquired from several sessions spread over a longer period of time. For example, after the first data 
acquisition session, subsequent sessions should be conducted at least 1 week apart from each of the other sessions. 
This will increase the chances that the acquired dataset captures the touch dynamics patterns variabilities. The 
findings or insights from this kind of study could facilitate another stream of related work on touch dynamics 
authentication, called the data adaptation, which employ effective relearning framework (Crawford et al., 2013) or 
online incremental learning algorithms (He et al., 2011) to continuously learn the new incoming touch dynamics 
pattern samples to increasingly enhance the accuracy performance, validity, and flexibility of the authentication 
model. 
Realistic and Open Dataset: Often, the subject size recruited are small in numbers (e.g. less than 30), confined 
to a specific age group (e.g. 19-26), or people from the nearby population (e.g. within a research institute). The 
dataset acquired under such conditions are often considered as the convenience samples, as it is relatively easier to 
acquire the data from the nearby population (Kenneth N. Ross, 1978). Sometimes, the samples analyzed or the 
  
conclusions drawn from the convenience samples could not realistically generalize to a wider population. This is 
more so the case when the convenience samples consist of people who are familiar with or frequently use mobile 
devices. To ensure that the conclusions drawn from a dataset generalized to a wider population, the best practice is 
to recruit a large group of subjects (e.g. at least 100 people) and the subjects have to be selected from diversified age 
groups or with different levels of device familiarity/usage frequency. 
Besides, the availability of public datasets is still very limited in this field. Without properly documented and 
realistic datasets, cross-comparison between different methodologies employed may not be conclusive. Sharing 
datasets or data acquisition tools is a highly recommended practice as it comes with a three-fold benefit. Firstly, by 
using a common dataset a more conclusive cross-comparison between different methodologies can be made. 
Secondly, the availability of open datasets facilitates researchers whom may not have the resource to develop a 
proper dataset for the experiment. Thirdly, using shared data acquisition tool, other researchers from different 
institutes can expand a dataset with subjects across different geographical locations. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
Touch dynamics biometrics have promising potentials to strengthen the security of mobile devices or on-line 
services accessible via mobile devices without additional hardware requirements. The availability of various sensors 
in recent mobile devices provides added opportunities for such potentials to be explored. This paper gives a 
comprehensive review of the research work or efforts made on touch dynamics biometrics on mobile devices. The 
paper first provides an overview, outlines the primary operational process and defines a set of criteria for the 
evaluation, of a touch dynamics authentication system. Then, it presents detailed implementations, experimental 
settings, and approaches of each of the process, namely, data acquisition, feature extraction, and decision making. 
Next, the performances reported in published work have been discussed. Finally, it discusses open issues in the topic 
area and recommends areas for further research. The review presented in this paper may provide a roadmap and 
stimulate further research in this area. 
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